
















Static and Dynamic Efficiency 
of Irreversible Health Care 
Investments under 
Alternative Payment Rules 
By Rosella Levaggi, Dip. di Scienze 
Economiche, University of Brescia 
Michele Moretto, Dip. di Scienze 
Economiche, University of Padova and 
FEEM 
Paolo Pertile, Dip. di Scienze 
Economiche, University of Verona 
 
 
 The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 
Corso Magenta, 63, 20123 Milano (I), web site: www.feem.it, e-mail: working.papers@feem.it 
 
INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS Series 
Editor: Fausto Panunzi 
 
Static and Dynamic Efficiency of Irreversible Health Care 
Investments under Alternative Payment Rules 
By Rosella Levaggi, Dip. di Scienze Economiche, University of Brescia 
Michele Moretto, Dip. di Scienze Economiche, University of Padova and 
FEEM 
Paolo Pertile, Dip. di Scienze Economiche, University of Verona 
 
Summary 
The paper studies the incentive for providers to invest in new health care technologies under 
alternative payment systems, when the patients' benefits are uncertain. If the reimbursement 
by the purchaser includes both a variable (per patient) and a lump-sum component, 
efficiency can be ensured both in the timing of adoption (dynamic) and the intensity of use 
of the technology (static). If the second instrument is unavailable, a trade-off may emerge 
between static and dynamic efficiency. In this context, we also discuss how the regulator 
could use the control of the level of uncertainty faced by the provider as an instrument to 
mitigate the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. Finally, the model is calibrated 
to study a specific technology. 
 
Keywords: Health Care, Investments 
 
JEL Classification: I18, D92 
 
R. Levaggi and P. Pertile acknowledge the support from the Italian Ministry of Education (PRIN 
programme 2007/2008). Earlier versions of the paper have been presented at the 10
th PET 
Conference in Istanbul, the 8th ECHE in Helsinki, the 2nd NERI meeting in Padova and at the 
University of Augsburg. We would like to thank the participants and in particular Mathias Kifmann 











Address for correspondence: 
 
Michele Moretto  
Facoltà di Economia 
Università degli Studi di Padova  
Via Ugo Bassi 1 
35131 Padova 
Italy 
E-mail: michele.moretto@unipd.it Static and Dynamic Eciency of Irreversible
Health Care Investments under Alternative
Payment Rules
R. Levaggiy M. Morettoz P. Pertilex
July 27, 2010
Abstract
The paper studies the incentive for providers to invest in new health
care technologies under alternative payment systems, when the patients'
benets are uncertain. If the reimbursement by the purchaser includes
both a variable (per patient) and a lump-sum component, eciency can
be ensured both in the timing of adoption (dynamic) and the intensity
of use of the technology (static). If the second instrument is unavailable,
a trade-o may emerge between static and dynamic eciency. In this
context, we also discuss how the regulator could use the control of the
level of uncertainty faced by the provider as an instrument to mitigate
the trade-o between static and dynamic eciency. Finally, the model is
calibrated to study a specic technology.
JEL classication: I18, D92
1 Introduction
Since quasi-markets started to spread across health care systems, health economists
have focused on the characteristics of the payment schemes, as a crucial point
in the contractual relationship between the purchaser and the provider. Several
peculiarities of the health care market have been highlighted and their implica-
tions for the denition of (second-best) ecient contracts investigated1.
R. Levaggi and P. Pertile acknowledge the support from the Italian Ministry of Education
(PRIN programme 2007/2008). Earlier versions of the paper have been presented at the 10th
PET Conference in Istanbul, the 8th ECHE in Helsinki, the 2nd NERI meeting in Padova
and at the University of Augsburg. We would like to thank the participants and in particular
Mathias Kifmann and Robert Nuscheler and for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer
applies.
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1See for example Chalkley and Malcomson (1998, 2000)
1One characteristic of the treatment provided to patients whose impact on the
eciency properties of alternative reimbursement schemes seems to have been
largely neglected so far is that often the provision of innovative treatments is the
result of an irreversible investment decision. The most obvious example is the
investment in equipment whose cost is sunk, at least to some extent. However,
there may be several other less obvious forms of irreversibility. For example,
Grin et al. (forthcoming) show that even when a new technology is such that
the decision to admit it to reimbursement is not formally irreversible (e.g. phar-
maceuticals, medical devices), it may involve some degree of irreversibility if the
decision weakens the incentive to accumulate new evidence on the actual (cost-)
eectiveness of the new technology.
Although some eorts have been made to interpret the empirical evidence con-
cerning the diusion of new technologies and the eect on the outcome of hos-
pital care2, the literature has not yet contributed to a full understanding of
how regulation should be used to ensure that adoption and use decisions of new
health technologies are \good value (health) for money" over time. A contri-
bution to the static dimension of the problem has been recently provided by
Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2009), but the dynamic dimension is still almost
unexplored, despite the awareness of its importance 3. This rather scant in-
terest is in sharp contrast with the concern that technological innovation is a
major health care cost driver (Weisbrod, 1988) and that uncertainty on the
performance of new technologies is often substantial at the outset (Gelijns and
Rosenberg, 1994; McClellan, 1995). A further motivation to investigate this
issue comes from the variety of solutions adopted in dierent health care sys-
tems for the reimbursement of capital costs (HOPE, 2006). For instance, in a
number of European countries (Austria, Finland, France, Italy, Sweden, The
Netherlands) taris tend to include these costs, whereas in others they may be
separately reimbursed (Denmark, Germany, Portugal, Spain).
The adoption of a new technology with the characteristics of an irreversible
investment is an intrinsically dynamic problem, the study of which requires to
depart from the structure of the static models mainly employed so far to study
the purchaser-provider relationship. Our approach is based on the literature on
investment under uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). This enables us to
investigate two dimensions of eciency for alternative payment schemes: the
static dimension concerning the provision of the treatment to those patients for
whom benets exceed costs, and the dynamic eciency concerning the optimal
adoption timing for a technology whose benets are still uncertain.
We show that both static and dynamic eciency are attainable if the purchaser
makes, on top of a xed fee per patient, a lump-sum payment to cover part
of the capital cost. If the payment is simply based on the xed price compo-
nent, a trade-o may emerge between static and dynamic eciency: the price
that ensures that the ecient number of patients is treated provides a weak
2See, among others, Bokhari (2009); Baker and Phibss (2002).
3\..., I will contend that economists have been too preoccupied with a one-period model
of health care services that takes technology as given, and that we need to pay more attention
to technological change."(Newhouse, 1992, p. 5).
2incentive to invest, so that the adoption of the new technology will be delayed
in comparison with the social optimum. The reimbursement systems adopted
in several countries do not involve any lump-sum payment at all. This may
be due to either liability constraints for the purchaser or inability to dierenti-
ate the pricing rules for technologies with substantial capital costs. Whatever
the reasons leading to this choice, our model shows that this payment system
produces a regulatory failure. Given the constraints that seem to characterize
the implementation of immediate capital cost reimbursements, we lastly discuss
use by the regulator of control of the uncertainty faced by the provider as an
instrument to mitigate the trade-o between static and dynamic eciency.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple version of the
model that yields closed-form solutions. These are obtained and discussed in
the following Section. A generalization of the model is presented in Section 4,
whereas Section 5 discusses the policy implications. Section 6 presents a cali-
bration of the model for a specic technology, which leads to the description of a
second-best ecient policy and to a tentative measure of the cost of a regulatory
failure for that case. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Base Model
2.1 The Environment
A new medical technology is available in the market and it requires an instan-
taneous sunk cost4, I, to be adopted. To simplify the analysis, and to obtain
closed form solutions that help the intuition of how the payment rule inu-
ences the provider's behavior, in this section we assume a linear form for the
instantaneous benet function5:
b(xt;t) = a + txt (1)
where xt is the number of patients treated in the period, and t is a measure of
eectiveness. Underlying eq. (1) is the assumption that all patients receive the
same benet from the treatment6.
The constant a represents the net benet accruing to society as a consequence of
the technology adoption, irrespective of the number of patients treated. It can
be interpreted as the net eect of informative spillovers, an impact on relational
quality, and the impact on the eciency of other providers which patients could
choose. The rst aspect relates to the impure public good aspect of the new
technology. Health care technologies produce a benet to all the individuals in
terms of an option value to use it in case of need. A new treatment is available
4The decision that we study may be indierently seen as the one of adopting the technology
to treat patients who were previously not treated, or to replace a standard technology with a
new one. In this case, the net benets of the former are normalized to zero.
5As will be shown in Section 4, the quality of the results obtained under this assumption
are robust to the choice of more general benet functions.
6This could be the case for some rather basic technologies, as well as highly specic tech-
nologies.
3and this positively aects the utility of each individual as a potential patient.
The second aspect relates to the positive eect that the new technology has
on the intrinsic motivation of the medical sta. The benet accruing to the
patients depends on the quality of the treatment which in turn depends on the
technological content of the health care (medical quality) and on the eort of the
medical sta in motivating the patient to comply with the therapy (relational
quality). A recent literature 7 allows the physicians' utility function to depend
also on the health outcome and the technology content of the productive process
adopted by the hospital. In this case, the introduction of the new technology
increases the eort of the medical sta in terms of relational quality, which in
turn improves the benet that patients receive from the treatment. Unlike the
rst two factors aecting the parameter a, the eect of a new adoption on the
eciency of provision of the treatment by other providers may be negative in
strongly competitive contexts. In this case, competition may create an incentive
to adoptions in excess of the ecient level, thus reducing the overall level of
eciency of provision8.
Since the technology is innovative, there is uncertainty on the benets that it
can actually provide to patients. In particular, we assume that  follows a
trendless geometric Brownian motion9:
dt = dwt
where dwt are identically and independently distributed according to a normal
distribution with mean zero and variance dt, and the volatility parameter  is
constant. The stochastic process represents uncertainty on the evolution of the
performance of the new technology. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
uncertainty is restricted to the period before the adoption. Once the investment
is made, the technology characteristics are xed at the level corresponding to
the time of adoption10.






For the sake of simplicity, we work with an innite time horizon. The model
requires identication of a component of the investment cost I, which is equally
7See Levaggi et al. (2009) and references therein.
8This is referred to as \medical arms race" in the literature (Robinson and Luft, 1985).
For a discussion of the impact of competition on the timing of investment in new health care
technologies under uncertainty, see Pertile (2008).
9This means that no deterministic change in eectiveness over time is assumed. Positive
drift parameters could be interpreted as reecting the expectation that on average the tech-
nology will go through a development process that leads to improvement in its performance.
None of the results that we obtain rely on this assumption.
10The situation where uncertainty stops once the technology has been adopted is consistent,
for example, with cases where it is related to the characteristics of the technology. In this
case, once a certain version of the technology is adopted, uncertainty disappears. Uncertainty
may not be resolved after the investment when it is due to limited evidence or the evolution
of the cost of materials - consumables or pharmaceuticals - necessary for the treatment.
4attributed to each period. Given the innite time horizon, this is I. With no
loss of generality we also assume that there are no xed costs, other than the
cost of investment.
2.2 The Purchaser
We assume that the purchaser maximizes total welfare over time. The corre-
sponding instantaneous payo function is,

pu
t = b(xt;t)   c(xt) (3)
In our model the purchaser has the same role as an external regulator that has
to dene the payment rule for a number of purchasers and providers, aiming
to maximize total welfare. Without loss of generality we assume that the pur-
chaser sets the rules. We also assume that the purchaser can commit to the
rule announced. The purchaser sets the payment rule and denes a level of ef-
fectiveness below which providers are not allowed to adopt the new technology.
In particular, we assume that there are two parameters which contribute to the
denition of the payment rule: the xed-fee which is paid for each treatment
provided, and a lump-sum contribution to investment costs, i.e. a sum that
the purchaser pays to the provider at the time of adoption, as a contribution
to capital costs. In spite of the present debate (Claxton et al., 2008), reim-
bursement schemes designed in dierent health care systems are more or less
strictly cost based. We partially follow this approach by separating the price
paid to the provider for each treatment into two components. The rst one is
meant to reimburse the marginal cost of the treatment provided, whereas the
second is a reimbursement of the capital cost component of the technology. The
marginal cost reimbursed may be dierent from the true marginal cost incurred
by the provider. In fact it represents the cost to treat the patient for whom the
marginal cost is equal to the marginal benet . In this respect our formula,
although cost based, also takes also account of the value of care produced. The
nature of the second component is such that its size will necessarily depend on
the number of patients treated. In particular, it will be greater the smaller the
number of patients treated. Moreover, given the form of the cost function, the
marginal cost component also depends on that variable.
The structure of the payment rule is the following:
Pt =
(
ptxt + I for t = tA
ptxt for t > tA
where tA denotes the time of adoption of the new technology by the provider.
In that period, the purchaser may decide to make a lump-sum payment  (0 
  1) that reduces the cost of investment actually faced by the provider. In
all periods in which the technology is in operation (t > tA), the purchaser pays







5where it is assumed that in setting the price level the purchaser refers to the
number of patients which is optimal from his standpoint (xs). The price is
made up of two components. The rst is the marginal cost of the treatment,
which is always covered by the price. The parameter  (0    1) captures an
additional component, which reects the part of xed costs reimbursed through
the price.
Since the number of patients that ensures equality between marginal costs and
marginal benets is xs
t = t, the price function for any period subsequent to
the adoption can be written as:




When the technology is adopted, the purchaser observes the value of  and sets
the price according to the rule in eq. (5). The payments made at the time of
adoption (if any) and in subsequent periods also depend on  and  to which the
purchaser had previously committed. Given our assumption that uncertainty
ceases after the adoption, the price is constant for any subsequent period.
For very low values of  this price formula could provide perverse incentives
implying increasing reimbursement prices as eectiveness falls. In real life, the
adoption of a technology with very low eectiveness will simply not be an issue
because there are typically authorities that would prevent the admission of these
technologies into the market11. We assume that the purchaser xes a minimum




This ensures that the price in eq. (5) is a non-decreasing function of . Un-
less explicitly stated, in the rest of the paper we deal with the case where   .
2.3 The Provider
We assume that the provider's instantaneous payo function is the dierence









xt   c(xt) (7)
The provider decides when to adopt the new technology, in order to maximize
its payo function over time. Although we also study the case where the pur-
chaser can enforce the desired number of treatments per period, we are mainly
11It is well known that in some health care systems, this rule is more or less explicitly
formalized. For example, the rule could take the form of a maximum value of the Incremental
Cost-Eectiveness Ratio (ICER).
12We could alternatively assume that below that level of eectiveness the provider can adopt
the technology, but the reimbursement per patient is p = 0. The result would be identical
because in both cases the provider never invests.
6interested in the situation where the provider is free to decide it. This is a very
relevant point in the current debate on the appropriateness in the use of health
care technologies. When the provider is free to set the number of treatments,
the denition of the payment rule aects the provider's payo and hence the
investment decision both directly, due to the change in the price per patient and
the actual cost of investment, and indirectly, by changing the optimal number
of treatments from the provider's perspective.
3 Optimal statics and dynamics
3.1 The rst best
In order to set a benchmark, we study the solution that ensures that the dier-
ence between the benets for patients from treatments provided and the costs of
the technology (adoption and operation) are maximized. Given the characteris-
tics of the purchaser's payo function dened above, the rst best solution also
coincides with the case where the purchaser decides both the timing of adop-
tion and the number of patients treated in each period. The solution to this
problem requires maximization of total welfare over time (eq. 3), also taking
the investment cost I into account.
To characterize such solution we dene the following dimensions of eciency:
 Static: eciency in the provision of the treatment, once the technology is
adopted. If the provision is ecient, only patients for whom the marginal
benet is at least as large as the marginal cost are treated. This require-
ment is satised when xs
t = t.
 Dynamic: eciency in the timing of adoption of the new technology. The
benchmark for this eciency dimension is given by a threshold value of
the stochastic variable that should trigger investment once hit, whereas
waiting is the dynamically optimal strategy for lower values.
The following proposition denes the optimal investment threshold for the rst-
best.








( a + I) (8)











    = 0 (9)
7It can be checked that  > 1 and that  is inversely related to the level of
uncertainty .
Proof:
Substituting the ecient number of patients into eq. (3), the following instantaneous









The type of problem to solve is referred to as \optimal stopping" in the real option
literature (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, chap.4). The idea is that at any point in time
the value of immediate investment (stopping) is compared with the expected value of
waiting dt (continuation), given the information available at that point in time (the
value of the stochastic variable) and the knowledge of the process. The value of the














pu(t;t) is the expected value of investing at time t, when the stochastic vari-
able is equal to t. For the sake of simplicity the project time horizon as well as the
option life are assumed innite.
V
pu may be interpreted as the value of the opportunity to invest in the new technology,
which is the maximum between the expected values of \killing" the option to invest
immediately, and waiting dt, thus keeping the option alive.
The optimal threshold may be obtained using dynamic programming (Dixit and Pindyck,















Before the investment is made, the project's value corresponds to the opportunity to
make the investment. This value may be written as Z

t (see Appendix).






















pu is the threshold that characterizes the optimal timing of investment. The
values of 

pu and Z are simultaneously determined imposing appropriate boundary
conditions on the value function. The typical boundary conditions for these problems
are the so-called value matching and smooth pasting conditions. The former ensures
that the value function is continuous between the waiting and stopping region, i.e. at








The substitution of this value into the value matching condition yields the value of
the threshold in eq. (8). Q.E.D.
Figure 1 illustrates the value functions incorporating the optimal decision. The
dashed line is the value of waiting (rst line in eq. 11), or the value of the op-
portunity to invest. Since the dynamic approach to the solution of the problem
8Figure 1: First Best Value Functions
recognizes that there is an opportunity but no obligation to invest, this value is
non-negative also for low values of , when the NPV (solid line), i.e. the value
of investing for a given value of , is negative. The threshold (
pu) is obtained
by imposing appropriate boundary conditions on the two functions in eq. (11):
value matching requires the value of waiting to equal the value of investing at
the threshold, smooth pasting requires their derivatives to be the same at that
point. Since it is optimal to invest for values of the threshold at least as large as
the threshold, above this the value of investing (second line in eq. 11) becomes
the relevant component of the value function. When the existence of an option
to postpone the investment is taken into account, the optimal threshold exceeds
the one corresponding to the NPV criterion (intersection between the solid line
and the horizontal axis). This dierence is larger the greater the uncertainty.
The level of the optimal threshold is inversely related to the expected time of
investment. Eq. (8) shows that unless a is very big (a  I)13 a positive thresh-
old exists only if  > 2. Since
d
d < 0; this means that if uncertainty exceeds
a certain level it is not optimal from the societal perspective to adopt the new
technology for any value of .14
13Obviously if a is very big, the level of benets is so high that from the societal perspective
it is optimal to adopt the new technology immediately and independently of the value of .
14Usually, very large levels of uncertainty may be observed at a stage where the adoption
of the technology is not permitted yet. For instance, Sculpher and Claxton(2005) use a log-
normal distribution to evaluate the health (utility) gain per 10 Kg weight loss due to the
adoption of the ORLISTAT. The standard error of the log-normal distribution is about 4.6%.
93.2 Number of patients set by the purchaser
In this section we assume that the purchaser sets the number of treatments to
provide, whereas the investment decision is left to the provider. Since static ef-
ciency is ensured by denition of this case, we concentrate on the instruments
available to the purchaser to ensure eciency in the timing of investment.
Proposition 2 When the provider is free to decide when to adopt the new tech-
nology, and the purchaser can set the number of treatments, the optimal timing







(I(1      )) (12)
Proof:
The instantaneous payo for the provider is obtained substituting the ecient number
of patients (x
s

















  I(1      )
The shape of the value function in the waiting region (L

t ) is the same as in the
previous case (see Appendix), where  > 1 is the positive root of 	() = 0. Only the

















The usual boundary conditions (value matching and smooth pasting) enable determi-







and hence the investment threshold in eq. (12) (Fig. 2). Q.E.D.
There is nothing to prevent the threshold as dened by eq. (12) from lying below
. When this is the case the payment rule is suciently generous to induce the
provider to invest at that level of , but the adoption is prevented16. When the
15The boundary conditions are employed to simultaneously determine the values of the
threshold and this constant.
16In this case although the provider is still able to claim the right to invest at a later date,
the stopping value equals zero over the whole range of values of . Therefore, provided that

pr1  , we may drop the interval 0     from the analysis.
10Figure 2: Value Functions
number of patients treated can be controlled by the purchaser, the parameters
 and  have identical eects (eq. (12)). In other words, the purchaser can
make the investment by the provider more (less) likely by increasing (reducing)
either the lump-sum payment  or the dierence between price and marginal
cost through . The two instruments have perfectly symmetric eects.
The comparison between the threshold in eq. (12) and the one corresponding
to the rst best (eq. 8) shows that:
Corollary 1 If the number of treatments is set by the purchaser, dynamic e-
ciency is attained by any payment scheme such that,




The above condition simply states that as long as a > 017 the lump-sum pay-
ment needed for a timely adoption of the new technology is increasing in the
ratio between the benet component of the adoption that the provider does not
internalize and the investment cost. By Proposition 1 it is also worth noting
that if a = 0 the purchaser can induce the optimal timing of investment by
setting  = 0 and  = 0, i.e. when all patients receive the same benet from the
treatment, dynamic eciency can be attained paying only the marginal cost.
17When a < 0, for example as a result of particularly strong competitive pressures towards
adoption, the optimal policy would imply either a price below the marginal cost ( < 0) or a
sort of taxation of the adoption ( < 0). However, the fact that these policies are far from real
world payment rules may be taken as an indication that technologies with these characteristics
are rare, to say the least. Therefore, in the rest of the paper we will focus on cases where
a  0.
11This result depends on the specic form (linear) of the benet function. As will
be shown in Section 4, replacing this functional form with one with decreasing
marginal benets,  = 0 and  = 0 implies a higher threshold for the provider
(i.e. a lower probability of investment) than for the purchaser, and subsequently
the need for the purchaser to intervene either with lump-sum payment or by
increasing the price above the marginal cost18.
3.3 Number of patients set by the provider
Unlike in the previous section, here we assume that the provider can decide
not only when to invest, but also the number of patients to treat. Technically
speaking there is no particular diculty in including the number of patients in
a contract, nor, in most cases, in verifying it. However, the relevance of the
international debate on appropriateness and necessity of treatments (Sistrom,
2009) suggests that the control of the number of treatments is dicult to im-
plement, and divergences from levels deemed ideal are asymmetric, cases where
patients in excess of the ecient level are treated being by far more frequent.
Furthermore, thresholds on reimbursement are rarely treatment specic; they
often include a wider range of activities of the hospital. Since in this case the
provider can decide the mix of treatments, those with a comparatively large
xed cost component are likely to be the most convenient to expand. However,
it can be shown that the quality of our results does not change, even when a
threshold on the number of patients exists, as long as its level exceeds the e-
cient level.
Proposition 3 When the provider can decide both the timing of adoption and
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In each period, the provider decides the number of patients to treat in order to max-
imize its instantaneous prot (eq. (7)), which, in our simple setting, implies x
p
t = pt
whilst, in setting the price, the purchaser still refers to the socially ecient number
of patients x
s













18In this case, the benet for each intramarginal patient exceeds the price so that in deciding
when to adopt the new technology, the provider fails to internalize part of the patients'
benets. The result is a delay in the adoption. In other words, the decreasing marginal
benet plays a similar role to a > 0 in the base model.
12Figure 3: Value Functions
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which is always increasing in  for   .















  I(1      ) for t  

pr2
By the standard boundary conditions at 


















Substituting this value into the value matching condition the threshold in eq. (16) is
obtained. Q.E.D..
Eq. (16) shows that in this case the eects of  and  on the optimal threshold
are not symmetric. An increase in  has the same eect as before. An increase
in  produces a further eect:
Corollary 2 When the provider is free to set the number of treatments, any in-
crease in  anticipates the expected time of investment as a result of the provider
anticipating the possibility of treating patients in excess of the ecient level.
13The last term on the right hand side of (16) captures the impact of an increase
in  on the adoption decision of the provider who anticipates the opportunity to
repay investment costs exploiting the impossibility for the purchaser to enforce
the ecient number of treatments19. This term implies a further decrease in
the threshold, irrespective of the value of 20. This eect is added to that of
the explicit reimbursement of capital costs embedded in the rst two terms in
brackets, which is equivalent to the one observed in the case where the number
of patients is set by the purchaser (eq. (12)). Therefore, whenever  > 0 the
possibility for the provider to decide how many patients to treat implies a lower
threshold and hence, ceteris paribus, an anticipation in the expected time of
investment in comparison with the situation where only the marginal cost is
paid for each patient.
4 The General Model
The specic functional forms of the benet and cost functions adopted in the
previous sections enable a closed form solution for the thresholds which im-
plicitly dene the timing of adoption of the new technology. In what follows,
we show that all the key results discussed so far are valid even if the marginal
benet is decreasing in the number of patients treated and the marginal cost is
increasing. In particular, we deem the extension to decreasing marginal bene-
ts important, because most new health care technologies are shown to provide
most benets to patients with specic characteristics and the potential bene-
ts decrease, or are at least more uncertain, as the treatment is provided to
patients who are lacking in some of those characteristics. Appropriateness, i.e.
ensuring that only patients who can really benet from the treatment receive
it, is a major issue in most health care systems. Therefore, this generalization
may provide insights into the impact of alternative payment rules on adoption
decisions and appropriateness in the provision of treatments.
The new benet and cost functions are given respectively by,





with 0 <   1 and  > 1.








19This result would not hold if the purchaser was unable to commit to the rule. In that case,
it would be ex-post ecient from his standpoint to set  = 0 once the investment has been
made. The provider would anticipate this and incorporate this parameter into the adoption
decision.
20Note that the sign of this term is the same as that of the term multiplying the terms in
brackets.














As in the base model, providers are free to decide when to invest in the new
technology, but this decision is subject to the constraint set by the purchaser















Using the same approach employed in the previous section, we can write the





















  I for t  
pug
(21)
By imposing the standard boundary conditions, the rst best investment thresh-






















The impacts of the main parameters on the optimal investment threshold are
consistent with those observed in the base model. Increases in the investment
cost (I) and the parameter a have opposite eects on the timing of investment.
The eect of the level of uncertainty is also the same: the threshold increases as
 decreases, which means that, all else being equal, the investment occurs later
in expected terms, the greater the value of .
4.2 Number of patients set by the purchaser
The instantaneous prot function for the purchaser is:






















  I(1      ) for   
prg1
(24)
15From these functions, the usual procedure can be used to obtain the optimal

















As in the previous subsection, the consistency of the impact of changes in the
main parameters with the case with linear benets can be easily checked.
4.3 Number of patients set by the provider
As for the base model, we are mainly interested in the study of the case where
the purchaser cannot enforce the socially optimal number of treatments. Given
the price in eq. (20) the provider sets the number of treatments in order to
maximize instantaneous prot, which becomes21,



























prg2 is the optimal investment threshold for the provider with the gen-
eralized benet and cost functions. It can be easily checked that the stopping
value is always increasing in  for   
g.
Imposing the usual boundary conditions, the following equation implicitly de-
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= (1   )I (29)
where, p; denotes the elasticity of price with respect to the eectiveness param-
eter. Eq. (29) highlights the role on the elasticity in determining the existence
and the level of the optimal threshold. A necessary condition for the existence
of a threshold is that p; <   1
 . If this does not hold, the value of investing
(left hand side) is always less than its net cost. Alternatively, for very low values
21In order to keep the notation as simple as possible, the price is denoted as an implicit
function of  in the payo and value functions.
16of elasticity, there may also be no threshold because the value of investing is
greater than its cost, independent of the level of eectiveness. In this case, the
investment will always take place. Since the term in brackets is never greater
than one for   
g, and given that the rst term on the left hand side is the
Net Present Value of the investment, eq. (29) also shows a standard result in
the real options literature, namely that the optimal threshold exceeds the NPV
threshold. The dierence between the two thresholds is greater, the smaller the
value of , i.e. the greater the uncertainty.
5 Policy
In this section, the policy implications of the results presented so far are dis-
cussed, also taking into account possible limitations on the set of instruments
available to regulators.
5.1 Two instruments
The best possible scenario for the purchaser is one in which he can control
the price level through  and the lump-sum payment through . By setting
 to zero, static eciency is ensured. By replacing this value into eq. (28),
the problem of dynamic eciency boils down to the one tackled in Section 4.2,
because the provider treats the socially ecient number of patients when the
price equals the marginal cost.
Proposition 4 If the regulator can decide on both  and , static and dynamic
eciency can be simultaneously ensured.
Proof:
It is sucient to prove that for  = 0 a value of  exists such that the provider's
threshold equals the rst best threshold. Setting the solution of eq. (28) for  = 0
equal to the right hand side of eq. (22), the value of  that ensures dynamic eciency
is obtained:











Eq. (15) is a special case of eq. (30) , for  = 1,  = 2 and  = 0. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 states that even when both the decision on the number of treat-
ments and on the timing of investment are decentralized, static and dynamic
eciency can be simultaneously achieved if the regulator can use both param-
eters dening the payment rule. In order to ensure this result, a two-part tari
is necessary: a variable component should cover the marginal cost of provision;
a lump sum paid upfront should instead be granted to cover a part of the capi-
tal cost. The optimal lump-sum payment depends on the characteristics of the
technology, but not on the level of uncertainty. In particular, the portion of
the investment cost to be immediately reimbursed is greater for targeted tech-
nologies (low ) and for those whose marginal cost is comparatively at (low ).
17Finally, large values of a obviously require a larger part of the investment cost
to be immediately reimbursed.
5.2 Limitations on the instruments set
The above section suggests an easy solution to the problem of static and dynamic
eciency when both the instruments introduced in the model are available. The
evidence on real reimbursement systems suggests that only some pricing schemes
involve lump-sum payments. In actual health care systems there can be dier-
ent reasons why the purchaser is unable or unwilling to pay at least part of
the capital cost of the investment. It is not our objective here to explore the
stimulating issue of why lump-sum contributions seem to be rather unpopular
in the real world. Simply, having observed this, we try to investigate the pol-
icy implications when the price per patient (through ) is the only instrument
available to the regulator ( = 0).
Corollary 3 When the payment scheme involves no lump-sum component, a
trade-o emerges between static and dynamic eciency.
Setting  = 0 in eq. (28), the following threshold characterizes the provider's
















which is greater than 
pug
22. This implies an ineciently weak incentive for
the provider to invest in the new technology. Since the derivative of 
prg2
with respect to  is negative, at least locally (see the Appendix), starting from
 = 0 it is always possible to anticipate the expected time of investment by
increasing the price above the marginal cost. Since 
prg2 is decreasing in ,
dynamic eciency could be ensured by increasing the price above the marginal
cost level. The price for inducing the provider to anticipate the investment
in this way is the provision of the treatment to some patients for whom the
marginal cost exceeds the marginal benet.
The following corollary immediately follows from the application of the theory
of the second-best to our problem:
Corollary 4 When the regulator is constrained not to include any lump-sum
component, it is second-best ecient to set  at a level such that the provider's
investment occurs later than in the rst best.
An obvious implication of the Corollary above is that if  = 0 is seen as a
constraint for the regulator, having technologies adopted later than would be
22It should be observed that, unlike in the base model, this is true also for a = 0 and for
negative values of a, provided they are suciently close to zero.
18socially ecient, which are used to treat patients in excess of the ecient level,
may be second-best optimal. Besides the rare use of capital costs contributions,
the relevance of the debate concerning appropriateness is another fact common
to most health care systems. Underlying is the idea that too many patients re-
ceive some treatments once a technology is adopted, in particular even patients
with characteristics such that the evidence on eectiveness or cost-eectiveness
is lacking. The coexistence of these two phenomena (no capital cost contribu-
tion and the issue of appropriateness) perfectly ts into our model when the
use of capital cost contribution is ruled out. Prices above marginal costs can
be interpreted as a way to improve dynamic eciency sacricing some static
eciency. As seen above, when the number of patients treated cannot be con-
trolled, the impact on the investment decision is twofold. The rst eect is the
pure contribution to capital costs embedded in the price (common to situations
with and without control over patients), the second is related to the fact that
the provider, at the time of deciding on the investment, anticipates the oppor-
tunity to exploit the dierence between price and marginal cost to increase the
number of patients and therefore revenues. In this context, the debate on ap-
propriateness may be interpreted as an attempt to implement a control over the
number of treatments, which would enable overcoming of the trade-o (Sections
3.2 and 4.2).
The policy question that naturally arises is what factors may contribute to
mitigate the trade-o. From eqs. (8) and (16), the dierence between the rst-
best and the decentralized threshold shrinks for comparatively low values of
a. Therefore, competitive pressures towards technology adoption, or other fac-
tors reducing the value of the xed eect, contribute to make the trade-o less
binding when the possibility of making lump-sum payments by the purchaser
is limited. However, the possibility for the regulator to inuence the factors
aecting the value of the xed benet of adoption a may be very limited.
The characteristics of our model lead to some further considerations. It has been
assumed throughout the paper that provider and purchaser face symmetric un-
certainty. The discussion above has concentrated on two standard instruments
typically available for regulation: price and lump-sum contributions to capi-
tal costs. However, in our setting, the control of uncertainty by the regulator
may be conceived as a further instrument when lump-sum payments are not
available. It is assumed in the paper that provider and purchaser face sym-
metric uncertainty and variations in the stochastic variable  are immediately
and completely reected by the purchaser in variations in the level of price paid
(eq. (5)). However, the regulator could also decide to transfer variations in the
stochastic variable only partially. As a standard result in the real options liter-
ature, the value of the option to postpone the investment is greater the greater
the level of uncertainty. Hence, a reduction in the level of uncertainty leads to
an anticipation of the expected time of adoption. Of course, in reality providers
and purchasers face symmetric technological uncertainty. However, the regula-
tor can reduce the level of uncertainty actually faced by the provider replacing
the total and instantaneous adaptation of price that has been assumed so far,
with a partial adaptation. Alternatively, lower and/or upper price boundaries
19could be set.
Assuming that  necessarily has to be set equal to zero, the extension of this
concept to our framework suggests that a reduction in the level of uncertainty
the provider faces could be used as an incentive to invest. This kind of incen-
tive, unlike an increase in , has no negative implications for static eciency. Of
course, there is a price for the use of this instrument, which is related to the fact
that some risk is transferred from the provider to the purchaser. However, this
transfer could be ecient as long as the opportunities to diversify risk (across
providers and technologies) are greater for the purchaser than for the provider.
6 The case of Positron Emission Tomography
In this section, we provide a numerical example by calibrating the model de-
veloped in Section 4 to t the characteristics of Positron Emission Tomography
(PET), one of the main innovations in diagnostic technologies in recent years.
The decision that we study is the adoption of a PET scan, whose cost is about
3,800,000 euros23. In order to do this, we use the following cost function:
c(xt) = 300x
t
We also assume that the net eect of the factors aecting a is such that a =
10;000 euros, and that the values of the technological parameters  and  are
respectively 0:8 and 1:2.
To simplify the analysis, we keep working on an innite time horizon, but we
introduce a jump process describing the probability that in each period a new
technology arrives, which makes PET obsolete. In other words, we assume that
once PET has been adopted, it will be in use until a suciently ground-breaking
innovation comes to replace it. In each period there is a given probability  that
PET becomes obsolete and therefore the number of examinations falls to zero.
It can be shown that formally, these assumptions simply imply that the relevant
discount rate becomes  +  (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, Ch. 4). We set  = 5%
and  = 5%, which implies that the expected length of the project is 20 years.
We study the static and dynamic eciency properties of some regulatory set-
tings by comparing respectively the actual with the ecient number of patients
treated and the actual with the ecient investment threshold. Concerning the
latter, it may be convenient to shift from a monetary measure of eectiveness
like  to a more readily interpretable measure like the QALY (Quality adjusted
life years). This requires  to be divided by the shadow value of a QALY
gained24. We set this parameter equal to 30,000 euro, which is a value consis-
tent with those usually employed in cost-utility analysis. Therefore, thresholds
in terms of QALYs are simply obtained by dividing the monetary value of the
threshold by 30,000.
23For a description of the main characteristics of the investment in PET, see Pertile et al.
(2009)
24This parameter coincides with the threshold value for cost-utility analysis.
20If the regulator can use both instruments, then static and dynamic eciency can
be simultaneously obtained by simply setting  = 0 and  according to the rule
in eq. (30). In our case, a lump-sum payment covering 61% of the investment
cost at the time of adoption (2,318,000 euros) would ensure the ecient timing
of adoption. If lump-sum payments are not available, or there are constraints
on the maximum amount that can be immediately reimbursed, both dimensions
of eciency cannot be simultaneously achieved. Let's rst investigate how the
optimal investment threshold varies for dierent levels of uncertainty assuming
that the purchaser only pays the marginal cost for each patient ( = 0,  = 0).
Table 1:  = 0; = 0
 0.01 0.08 0.15
First-Best
Threshold 6,221 7,614 11,482
Patients 711 1,178 3,289
Price 1,339 1,480 1,818
Decentralized
Threshold 8,518 10,426 15,723
Ecient no. patients 1,599 2,584 7,216
Patients 1,599 2,584 7,216
Price 1,566 1,732 2,128
Delta
Threshold (euro) 2,297 2,812 4,241
Threshold (QALY) 0.077 0.094 0.141
Patients 0 0 0
Table 1 shows the main results for this case for three dierent levels of un-
certainty (1%, 8%, 15% standard deviation). For the rst best, the table re-
ports the optimal investment threshold (
pug), the ecient number of patients
(xs(
pug)), and the corresponding price (p(
pug)) calculated on the threshold.




prg2)) is reported in the second part of the table for the decen-
tralized solution (the provider decides how many patients to treat). This part of
the table also reports the ecient number of patients given the provider's thresh-
old (xs(
prg2)). This is dierent from the rst best number of patients because
decentralization implies that investment is undertaken for values of  which are
larger than the rst best threshold (>
prg2
pug). Since the threshold is higher,
the ecient number of patients is larger. The lower part of the table shows the
properties in terms of dynamic and static eciency, through the dierences in
the thresholds (both in monetary terms and in terms of utility/eectiveness)
and the number of patients treated. In particular, the comparison is between
the rst best and decentralization for the thresholds (rows 1 and 4), and be-
tween the actual and the ecient (given the decentralized threshold) number of
patients (rows 5 and 6)25.
For example, if the purchaser only pays the marginal cost for each patient, with
 = 0:01, the rst-best investment should take place for values of  at least as
25Since in our model static eciency is only dened for a given level of eectiveness, the
comparison between the rst best number of patients and the decentralized number would be
meaningless.
21large as 6,221 euros, which is lower than the provider's threshold (8,518 euros).
The dierence (2,297 euros) corresponds to 0.077 QALYs. At the provider's
threshold, the number of patients treated is ecient as a result of having set
 = 0, and therefore static eciency is ensured. However, the delay in the
expected time of adoption makes the situation dynamically inecient. Table
1 also shows that uncertainty exacerbates the problem of dynamic ineciency,
reaching a dierence of 0,141 QALYs with  = 0:1526.
Table 2:  = 0:35; = 0
 0.01 0.08 0.15
First-Best
Threshold 6,221 7,614 11,482
Patients 711 1,178 3,289
Price 1,339 1,480 1,818
Decentralized
Threshold 6,944 8,677 13,458
Ecient no. Patients 935 1,632 4,891
Patients 1,510 2,099 5,238
Price 1,556 1,662 1,996
Delta
Threshold (euro) 723 1,063 1,976
Threshold (QALY) 0.024 0.035 0.066
Patients 575 467 347
Table 2 shows the role of uncertainty in determining the size of the trade-o
when the lump-sum payment is not available ( = 0). The parameter  has
been xed at 0.35, so that the quality of this combination of parameters ( = 0,
 = 0:35) is similar to that of a possible second-best from the purchaser's stand-
point (Corollary 4)27. Since the change in  is the only dierence from Table 1,
the rst-best results are not aected. As a result of the increase in the price, the
provider's threshold is reduced, and therefore the expected time of investment
anticipated. The improvement in dynamic eciency is shown by the smaller
dierences between the rst-best and the provider's thresholds in Table 2, in
comparison with Table 1. The drawback of raising the price above the marginal
cost is a number of patients treated that exceeds the ecient level, as the last
row in the table shows. It is interesting to see that the impact of uncertainty
on static eciency is dierent from that on dynamic eciency. Whereas the
rst increases with uncertainty, moving from 0.024 QALYs to 0.066 QALYs, the
second falls, moving from 575 patients more than the ecient level to 347.
The Table also provides some insights into point discussed at the end of the
previous section, concerning the implications of purchaser and provider facing
dierent levels of uncertainty. The purchaser's threshold with  = 0:08 is 7,614
euros. For the provider, the thresholds are 6,944 and 8,677, respectively with
26In the discussion of the example we ignore the technical limits that imply a maximum
number of treatments that can be provided in one period (around 2,500). In fact, this is
the only case ( = 0,  = 0,  = 0:15) among those considered, where the capacity limit is
binding. Tables 2 and 3 show that when the payment parameters are eciently set (rst- or
second-best) the number of treatments provided is within the capacity limit).
27See also Table 3.
22 = 0:01 and  = 0:08. This suggests that there is a value of  between
these two values such that the decentralized threshold corresponds to the rst-
best, calculated for  = 0:08. This means that if the uncertainty faced by the
provider could be substantially reduced, the dynamic ineciency of the situa-
tion described in Table 2 could be virtually eliminated.
Finally, we want to study the optimal policy by the regulator when lump-
sum payments are not available ( = 0) and therefore the trade-o between
static and dynamic eciency arises (Table 3). We do this by studying how the
present value of the investment from the purchaser's standpoint changes as 
is increased, starting from  = 0, assuming that the provider sets the number
of patients (Table 3). Given the purchaser's objective function, the expected






















with  > 1.
Table 3: Second-best ecient pricing rule
Dynamic e. Static e. Present Value
 FB thresh. Dec. Thresh. E. patients Dec. patients
0 0.275 0.377 3,160 3,160 1,829,170
0.1 0.275 0.363 2,886 2,995 1,923,420
0.2 0.275 0.348 2,585 2,812 2,030,650
0.3 0.275 0.328 2,240 2,599 2,148,090
0.38 0.275 0.307 1,899 2,385 2,226,890
0.39 0.275 0.304 1,848 2,353 2,231,310
0.4 0.275 0.300 1,795 2,319 2,232,750
0.41 0.275 0.297 1,739 2,283 2,220,680
0.42 0.275 0.292 1,677 2,243 2,220,680
The starting value of the stochastic parameter (0) is set at 7,000 euros, with
 = 0:1. The other parameter values are as above. Table 3 shows the trade-
o due to the increase in the price above the marginal cost. Increases in 
anticipate the investment thus reducing the gap from the rst best threshold,
but also increase the number of patients above the ecient level28. For the case
under examination a value of  = 0:4 yields the maximum present value for the
investment, and hence the optimal trade-o. Consistently with the statement in
Corollary 4 this second-best solution involves both static and dynamic eciency.
28The number of patients in columns 4 and 5 are both calculated on the provider's threshold.
23The former takes the form of a larger threshold and hence a delay in investment,
with a dierence of 0.025 QALYs. The latter leads to treat patients in excess
of the ecient level (2,319 vs. 1,795). The comparison between the second best
Present Value (2,232,750 euros) and the rst best (2,437,640 euros), attainable
with a lump-sum payment covering 61% of the investment cost and a xed fee
equal to the marginal cost, provides an estimate of the cost of the regulatory
failure. In our case this is 204,890 euros.
7 Conclusion
The paper employs the typical instruments of the literature on irreversible in-
vestments under uncertainty to investigate the implications of alternative re-
imbursement rules. Although decisions with these characteristics are frequent
in the health care sector (e.g. at the time of adopting innovative equipment)
and often have substantial impacts on costs, specic regulation issues related
to these have been rarely addressed in the literature so far. Moreover, there is
a substantial variety among the solutions implemented in dierent health care
systems.
A central issue investigated in the paper is the distinction and the interaction
between static eciency (providing the treatment to an ecient number of pa-
tients once the technology has been adopted) and dynamic eciency (eciency
in the timing of adoption). If the purchaser is unable to set the level of pa-
tients at the ecient level, the choice of the payment scheme inuences both
the timing of adoption and the number of patients that receive the treatment.
We have investigated the properties of a number of instruments available to the
regulator to improve eciency. If the purchaser can give the provider immedi-
ate reimbursement of a fraction of the capital cost (appropriately determined)
when the provider decides to invest in the new technology, then both dynamic
and static eciency are obtained by simply paying the marginal cost for each
patient treated. However, if for some reasons lump-sum payments cannot be
used, a trade-o emerges between static and dynamic eciency: the incentive
to adopt the new technology when the price equals marginal cost, thus ensuring
static eciency, is too weak. In this case, the adoption of the technology occurs
later than would be ecient.
The evidence from real world health care systems suggests that lump-sum reim-
bursements of capital costs are not frequently used. This may be due to either
liability constraints for the purchaser or inability to dierentiate the pricing
rules for technologies with substantial capital costs (typically equipment). Al-
though the investigation of exactly why this may be the case is beyond the scope
of this work, our results provide a possible explanation of why appropriateness
(provision of treatments only to those patients that really need it) is an issue
in several health care systems. It is also interesting to note that the regulators
in health care systems that are more sensitive to this issue are moving in the
direction described in our model. In Switzerland the new DRG system that will
come into force in 2012 foresees a model for capital reimbursement that is very
24similar to the one we have presented in this paper29. The calibration of the
model for the case of PET has provided a tentative estimate of the monetary
cost of departing from the optimal payment rule, by relying only on the payment
of a xed price per patient.
For the health care systems that still use a pure DRG system , our model set-up
enables the identication of instruments that could be used by the purchaser as
a substitute for the immediate reimbursement of capital cost to foster dynamic
eciency. For example, setting boundaries to the variation of prices in response
to changes of the stochastic variable, would reduce the variance actually faced
by the provider and hence reduce the value of the option to postpone the in-
vestment.
Hopefully, these results will contribute to the development of the theoretical
analysis of the incentives underlying specic purchasing rules when the provi-
sion of the service requires an irreversible commitment of resources. Our model
could be developed in a number of directions. For instance, competition is only
implicitly treated in our analysis through the impact on the xed net benet
component. It would also be interesting to investigate the sensitivity of the
results to changes in the objective functions of the purchaser and the provider.
Finally, the interaction of the payment rule with other policy tools (e.g. a di-
rect control by the purchaser on the timing of investment) could also provide
useful insights. In particular, the reallocation of risk (uncertainty) between the
purchaser and the provider as a policy tool could be a fruitful area for future
research.
8 Appendix
Derivation of the value function in the waiting region:
The value of the project before the investment is made, F(), follows the following


















The substitution of this into eq. (34) yields the following dierential equation:
















29See http://www.swissdrg.org/fr/07 casemix oce/InformationenZuSwissDRG.asp?navid=11.
25where, 1 > 1 and 2 < 0 are the solutions of eq. (9). The value of Z1 and Z2 is
obtained imposing appropriate restrictions. First, for values of  that tend to zero, the
term Z2
2 would make the value jump to innity. Of course, this is inconsistent with
our problem, given that the provider is not allowed to invest for  < , and therefore
the value of the corresponding opportunity to invest is zero. Therefore, Z2 has to be
set equal to zero. The value of Z1 is determined simultaneously with the value of the
optimal threshold, as explained in the text. Since Z1 is the only relevant constant
throughout, the subscript has been dropped in the text to simplify the notation.




















































The sign of this expression depends on that of the denominator. In order to simplify
the notation, below we replace 

prg2 with 

































































































































































































The sign of this expression is positive for  = 0. Therefore, we can draw conclusions





Proof of eq. (33)
The solution to E0[e
 (+")tA] can be obtained via the usual dynamic programming
decomposition (Dixit et al., 1999 p.184).
Since the process t is continuous, the expected discount factor is increasing in 0
and decreasing in 

prg2; then it can be dened by a function D(0;

prg2). Over the
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; where  > 1 is the positive root of the auxiliary
quadratic equation 	() =
1
2
2(   1) +     = 0.
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